A Critique of the Crito and an Argument for Philosophical Anarchism

A unfavorable judgwork forcet of the Crito and an Argument for Philosophical Anarchism by Forrest Cameranesi In this es register I depart present a outline and critique of Platos dialogue Crito, focusing especially on Socrates arguments in favor of his obligatory respect to the A consequentlyian shows death sentence.In response I bequeath represent the position that no angiotensin converting enzyme lifelikely holds any(prenominal) obligation to obey the domineering commands of an separate (or any body of others much(prenominal) as a kingdom), and further that no nonpareil ass come to hold such obligations nevertheless by squash although batch may still be stimulate to obey commands issued to them, when what is commanded is obligatory strong-minded of it cosmos commanded by anyone.Thus I will argue that that if, as both Socrates and Crito presume, the command that Socrates be kill is opposition to true justice (that is, contrary to any natural moral obligation s, independent of its legality), then Socrates has no obligation to obey it and in fact those tasked to carry out the order ar virtuously obligated to disobey it, and by their obedience commence conspirators to a moral crime. The dialogue begins with Socrates in prison, awakening to Critos presence in his cell, Crito having bribed the guards to gain entry.After brief pleasantries and some talk of when the day of Socrates execution will fall, Crito admits to Socrates that his figure t here(predicate) is to free him from prison and take him abroad to Thessaly, which he assures him can be successfully do thanks to the aid of a number of foreign benefactors. But Socrates is hesitant to leave, believing himself obliged to wait and ply his penalty to be completed, take(p) though his sentence, they both concede, is mappingial.Still, Socrates is eager to be convinced other, if Crito can do so by reputes of reason, and so Crito plies Socrates with many arguments in favor of his escape, list non nonwithstanding that it is possible and desirable to escape, and that Socrates could live well outside of Athens, besides that it is the just thing to do for the sake of the welf ar of his children, who will deport without his c atomic number 18 for the sake of standing fast against his enemies in the enjoin of Athens, who atomic number 18 attempting to unconventional him by this sentence and for the sake of his friends reputations, which will be besmirched by those who know either Socrates nor his friends, and will think that Socrates died solitary(prenominal) be courting his friends could not or would not buy his freedom. But Socrates dismisses these arguments, especially the last, arguing at length that the opinions of the many are not a relevant shootation in any such decision a very important argument, to which I will revert later in this essay. For now the relevant point is that Socrates only concern, in the question of whether or not to escape, is whether or not escaping is just not what muckle at large may think of their decision or what other consequences may follow from it.On the topic of justice, and counter to Critos argument that Socrates is obliged to fight back against wrongs committed against him, Socrates suggests (and Crito accepts) the principle that to return ill-use for harm is harmful, to return evil for evil is evil, to return injustice for injustice is inequitable, etc. and and then that such vengeance ought not be perpetrated, for it is just as harmful, evil and unjust as the act being avenged, and one must never do such wrongs.Socrates considers it harmful and unjust to the pass on to disobey its laws, and feels therefore obligated to obey them rather, for to do otherwise would be harmful, unjust, and wrong and here I disagree with Socrates. Though I accept his principle of justice, that one must not return wrongs in kind for to do so is merely to do more wrong, I do not believe that merely resi sting attempted harm to oneself necessarily harms the attacker and even if the attacker does suffer harm from the resistance it is as a result of his own wrongdoing, not any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.If someone attempts to strike at me, I step out of his way, and he falls on his subject as a consequence, I have not harmed him, although he has come to harm. If he attempts to strike at me, I hold up a shield, and he injures his fist upon it, I have not harmed him, although he has come to harm. Somewhat more analogously to the case at hand, harm may come to a street gang initiate whose initiation task is to mug me, inasmuch as he loses his status at bottom the gang (and perhaps the gang itself loses status in the community), should I evade him and escape save surely I did not do that harm, though it was a consequence of my actions.Likewise, harm may come to the state as a consequence of successful disobedience against it, inasmuch as its motive and thus its authority will be less respected, but this is not the same as the dis obedient one directly harming the state, say in the way a foreign conqueror would. None of these situations involve doing anything directly to harm the aggressor, but rather only the consequences of the aggressors own actions failing. Thus, such resistance is not prohibited by the principle that one ought never do harm, for one is not doing harm merely by evading harm, even if harm indirectly results as a consequence of such evasion.Certainly we would not say that it is obligatory to allow oneself to be assaulted or robbed, even if we say that to retaliate in kind is forbidden. In all these circumstances, the aggressors are being harmed as a consequence of their own actions and in the latter two cases, of the mugger and the unjust state, they suffer only in their reputation, losing the respect or fear and subsequent power they might have otherwise enjoyed, yet which, for their failure, they do not deserve.In my third examp le, as in the case before Socrates and Crito, the only acquittance suffered is a loss of reputation and the power that reputation often entails. This connection among reputation and power is an important facet of my argument, for it is self-evident to me that the only significant power the state itself has is its reputation, the respect and obedience that tidy sum give to it with no obedient subjects to enforce its laws over those who are not so obedient, or with meager portions of the populace willing to tolerate such enforcement, the state would have no power.In fact I argue that in such a case the state would not exist and really, that no states ever real exist, in any strict sense. There are merely masses of people, with an assortment of opinions on what is dependable, bad, morally neutral, permissible, impermissible, and obligatory all of whom exert whatever influence they can manage, by whatever means they call up best, to see that their opinions on such matters are enf orced that justice, as they understand it, prevails. And when some person or block of people manages to secure equally unchallenged influence ver the behavior of the other people in an area (that is, when sufficient people act to enforce one code of behavior and a sufficient portion of the remainder tolerate them), we falsely attribute the existence of some sort of social entity in a higher place and beyond the collection of individual people, and call that entity the state. But even a monarch only has his power because enough people believe in and support the monarchy, and enough of the remainder tolerate it as has been demonstrated wherever a monarchy was overthrown from within by a democratic revolution.It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that democracy entails legitimacy it only means that all states are on some deep level democratic, differing only in the degree that the people delegate their power to other people, in effect modeling their vote as what ever he says. The prevailing opinions may still be entirely wrong I merely claim that it will nearly always be the majority opinion which prevails. I say nearly because this phenomenon is dependent upon the relatively small differences in true private power between or so individuals, which are quickly diluted in larger groups, but still present in sufficiently small groups. A knight may be stronger and more skilled than any peasant, but it does not take many fed-up peasants working together to counter the power of that knight, so as the sizing of the group the knight is a part of grows, his relative power over the whole group decreases rapidly, unless it is bolstered by the support or at least tolerance of other members of the group.Thus for groups of any significant size, the differences in personal power between individuals can be safely ignored, and so the determining factor is not who supports a position but how many support it). The opinions of the people who encompass the l egislature of this state be it one person as in an absolute monarchy, some minority in an oligarchy, or the majority in a direct democracy then become the law.Those things judged by such people as obligatory become required by law those things judged as forbidden become prohibited by law and those things judged as permissible are allowed by the law. But in any form of government, especially in a direct democracy such as ancient Athens, the laws of men are zip fastener but the opinions of men backed by power, that power resting ultimately in the will of the majority the only differences between government thus being the degree and structure of power delegation, and what the opinions of those delegates are.With it thus established that states are no more than masses of people and their laws no more than the opinions of said people backed by power, not only do I object to Socrates insistence that he must be obedient to the states death sentence, but it is plainly obvious to me that Socrates himself ought to conclude this, if he was to be legitimate with his own earlier position that the opinions of men, as such, are irrelevant, no matter what power they may be backed by. But wherefore, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? says Socrates. Good men are the only persons who are worth considering. Crito eventually concedes this point, agreeing that the opinions of the many are irrelevant only the opinions of good men matter. But what is it that imparts a man good? Is that not part of what is at question here which sorts of acts are right and which are wrong, which are just or unjust? (A good man, I take it, being one who acts rightly or justly).Certainly being good cannot be merely being seen as good in the eyes of the many, or supporting the commands of the many, for then the opinions of the many and the opinions of good men could never conflict, as good men by definition would always be of the opinion that the majority is right and So crates statements differentiating their opinions would make no sense. So Socrates must agree that goodness is something nonsubjective, independent of the opinions of the many.Yet in the dialogue, after Socrates and Crito discuss at some length their agreement to disregard the opinions of the many in considering what ought or ought not be done, and to consider only what is or is not just, Socrates proclaims From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the Athenians. But from where does this concern for the consent of the Athenians come, when we have just snub the opinions of the many (in this case the many of Athens) for what is consent if not simply the opinion that something ought to be permitted?Socrates answers, in the translator of the Laws of Athens (speaking to him) You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any flush or under any compuls ion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which succession you were at liberty to leave the metropolis, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. In short, Socrates is concerned with his obedience to the people of Athens (or at least the government collectively representing them) because he feels he has implicitly agreed to be bound by the decisions of the Athenian government by remaining in the city. But in response I argue that no one can, by any contract implicit or explicit, transform the natural moral obligations which are binding on all men at all times.The well-nigh exemplary and broadly agreeable instantiation of this principle is that one cannot sell oneself into break ones backry, for all men have natural rights (which is to say, obligations naturally owed to them by others) which they cannot give up even if they so choose.For instance, if we grant that all are naturally obliged to refrain from strikin g me except in such instances as I consent to them doing so, then while I may vary whether or not I consent to be struck, and thus vary whether or not it is morally permissible to strike me at that moment, I cannot vary whether or not it is morally permissible to strike me contrary to my consent, for it is naturally obligatory that none do so. That is, I cannot, in a morally binding way, agree that henceforth so-and-so may strike me as he pleases regardless of my consent at that moment.Any such contract offering terms contrary to natural obligations is invalid and thus contracts of slavery, whereby one waives all of ones natural rights (which is to say, all obligations naturally owed to oneself by others), are the epitome of invalid contracts. This relates to the situation at hand with Socrates and Crito in that a contract to obey the lordly commands of some entity (e. g. the state of Athens), provided only that they are issued forth in prescribed proper manner (e. . by the formal proceedings of the Athenian court) and otherwise irrespective of the contents of those commands, seems to me no different than a contract to slavery, with the entity in question (the state) as the slave master for what is slavery but complete subjugation to the arbitrary will of another? Socrates himself admits this similarity, saying (once again in the voice of the Laws, speaking to himself) can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave? Yet Socrates has a reply here as well, already quoted above he has had many years in which he was free to leave the city if he did not wish to be bound by its laws, and by remaining he has implicitly agreed to be bound by them. Certainly a man cannot be a slave if he is free to leave his bonds at any time. But I respond that even such voluntary bonds are contractually invalid, for remaining on the lands of another still does not make one subject to the arbitrary will of the landproprietor. The only obligation owed to the owner o f some topographic point, as such, is to refrain from performing upon his property contrary to his consent.Likewise the only punishment the property owner may apply simply for disobeying his commands (but not violating any natural obligations, e. g. harming someone or their property, which may warrant further punishment) is to refuse him the use of his property in the case of land, ejecting him from the premises. By voluntarily entering and remaining in my home, my guests do not become subject to my arbitrary authority, to be enforced as I see fit at most I have the authority to eject them from my home, if I grow tired of their presence there.Nor by voluntarily entering a corporate office do I become subject to the authority of the corporation, beyond the revocability of my permission to remain therein. Likewise, even if we grant that the city of Athens is the property of the state of Athens (i. e. of its people collectively, rather than parcelled out into individually owned plots) , the greatest punishment morally justified simply for behaving in ways the state dislikes (but not in any way which is truly unjust) is banishment from the city.Thus, while the state may have the moral authority to forbid and punish legitimate injustices (which I agree it does, though no more so than any individual), it does not have the moral authority to enforce its arbitrary will upon those who reside within its borders it merely has the authority to eject them from its lands if it chooses to do so, for which it needs no cause at all, if it is indeed the legitimate owner of those lands.Thus if Socrates truly believes that he has done nothing unjust, then he should not (if accepts my principle regarding contracts and natural obligations) feel subject to the punishment decreed for him, though he may concede the states authority to banish him, if he holds the state to be the legitimate owner of the city.I would further question whether it is right to presume that a state is the leg itimate owner of its territory (rather than apiece citizen owning their own portion in private, as well as some world portions in common), and thus whether it even has the authority to banish the disobedient but that is another lengthy topic, for which I do not have room in this essay. In conclusion, I see no reason for Socrates to consider the will of the people of Athens (as channeled via their government) binding pon him and I believe he should seek an answer to the question at hand, whether or not to escape from his punishment, solely by asking whether he has done anything to warrant that punishment and it appears that he believes he has not. There is no guarantee that his opinion on this matter is correct the state of Athens may in fact be correct, and thus Socrtes punishment just. But to defer to the public opinion over ones best judgment is never epistemologically sound.Men of reason do not turn to authority, even democratic authority, to answer questions of biology or che mistry or physics, but instead we appeal to evidence and sound logical arguments to determine the answers and I see no reason why questions of ethics should be subject to any less rigorous and independent methodologies. By denying that any person, text, or institution has any special epistemic or alethic authority (the ability to magically betoken or reveal the uprightness, or to create it by fiat), we do not deny the existence of objective truth.Nor by denying that any king, law book, or legislature has any special deontic authority (the ability to magically divine or reveal our obligations, or to create them by fiat) do we deny that there are objective standards of justice. In both cases we merely concede that we are all in the same standing regarding truth or justice, respectively and we leave it to each individual to seek it for themselves, to sway others with arguments where they can, and to act upon it as they cast necessary or appropriate, regardless of decrees or prior ag reements to the contrary.